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Abstract Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two
independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither tes-
timony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility
results do not apply when testimonies agree on incidental details.
Keywords Coherentism · Witness model · Probability theory · Coherence ·
Testimony · Bayesian
1 Introduction
According to the coherence theory of justification, a coherent set of multiple pieces of
evidence may provide justification for a belief even though none of the pieces of evi-
dence individually provides any justification for that belief. Among the most important
contributions to this theory is Laurence BonJour’s The structure of empirical knowl-
edge 1985.1 Advocating the coherentist position, BonJour (pp. 147–148) appeals to
the example given by Lewis (1946, p. 346) of ‘relatively unreliable witnesses who
independently tell the same circumstantial story’. Lewis uses this example to argue
that coherence can amplify the credibility of the witnesses but, contrary to coherentist
doctrine, he insists that each witness must have some initial degree of individual cred-
ibility that can be amplified. BonJour argues that coherence can generate credibility
among testimonies where there was none.
Huemer (1997) provides a formal model in which BonJour’s claims about the
witness example collide with the rules of probability theory. Let A denote a proposition,
1 An excellent critique of coherentism is Erik J. Olsson’s Against coherence 2005.
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and ¬A its negation. There are two witnesses. Let A1 be the proposition that the
testimony of the first witness implies A and let A2 be the proposition that the testimony
of the second witness implies A. Let us suppose that the witnesses do not influence
one another and that neither witness alone has any impact upon our belief in A. Is
it possible then that the conjunction of A1 and A2 would cause us to revise upwards
the probability that A is true? In other words, are conditions (1)–(3), as given below,
mutually compatible?
(1) Witness independence: P(A2 | A1, A) = P(A2 | A)
P(A2 | A1,¬A) = P(A2 | ¬A)
(2) Individual irrelevance: P(A | A1) = P(A)
P(A | A2) = P(A)
(3) Coherence justification: P(A | A1, A2) > P(A)
Huemer (1997) proves that these three conditions are not jointly compatible. Gen-
eralizations of this impossibility result are proved by Olsson (2005), Shogenji (2005)
and Olsson and Shogenji (2004).
Olsson (2002) sets out a different witness model in his discussion of L. Jonathon
Cohen’s The probable and the provable 1977. 2 Olsson and Shogenji (2004) and Olsson
(2005) use that model to test Lewis’s theses. Olsson’s model features two propositions
that are not in Huemer’s model. One proposition is that both witnesses always tell
the truth, and the other is that they always generate their reports at random. Prior
probabilities are assigned to these propositions (summing to one). These probabilities
can be updated when the witnesses give their testimonies.
An effect of these additional propositions is that the impact of corroboration
becomes much more dramatic, particularly when witnesses agree on something pre-
viously thought improbable. Even if individual witnesses have just a slight degree
of positive credibility, the probability of a proposition being true can rise rapidly as
we hear cohering testimonies in support of it. However, without that slight degree of
individual credibility this amplification cannot happen.
So both Huemer’s and Olsson’s models support what Olsson and Shogenji call
Lewis’s negative thesis that “if . . . independent items [of evidence] are irrelevant to
the hypothesis when taken singly, then they are also irrelevant when taken together
however congruent they may be” (Olsson and Shogenji 2004). This presents a serious
challenge to the theory of coherence justification.
2 Reconciliation
In two later contributions, Huemer (2007, 2011) argues that coherentists can escape
from his previous impossibility result. Also, Shogenji (2005) demonstrates that recur-
rent coherence can generate justification from scratch. In this section I give a brief
outline of some of the results contained in those papers.
2 A variation of Olsson’s model is proposed by Bovens et al. (2002).
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2.1 Quasi independence
Huemer (2007) proves that conditions (2) and (3) imply that P(A2 | A1, A) > P(A2 |
A1,¬A). Lets us denote this inequality by (1*). Huemer argues that the coherentist
can replace condition (1) with (1*) and thereby circumvent the impossibility result.
Huemer makes clear, however, that while this offers an escape from impossibility it
does not vindicate the theory of coherence justification. To see why this is the case,
consider the following scenario.
Suppose there are two witnesses to the landing of a fair coin. Let A be the proposition
that the coin landed heads up. The witnesses have agreed that if the coin lands heads
up then they will either both lie (with a probability of 1/2) or both tell the truth
about which way the coin has landed. If the coin lands tails up then each witness
will decide individually, at random and without bias, whether to lie or be truthful.
Each testimony individually is worthless and yet if both witnesses testify that A is
true then the probability of A rises from 1/2 to 2/3. Conditions (1*), (2) and (3) are
satisfied, and even the second equation of condition (1) is satisfied. The problem is
that this scenario is not at all like the example given by Lewis that BonJour appeals
to, in which witnesses tell their stories independently. So BonJour’s position is not
vindicated by the compatibility of these conditions.
2.2 Weak nonfoundationalism
An interesting feature of the coin example given above is that if both witnesses report
that the coin landed tails up then the probability that the coin landed tails up actually
falls from 1/2 to 1/3. It turns out that this is not unique to the coin example. Huemer
(2011) proves that conditions (2) and (3) imply that P(A | ¬A1,¬A2) > P(A).
This inequality is called negative coherence justification and it is clearly not con-
sistent with coherentism. However, Huemer argues that the coherentist can replace
condition (2) with the requirement that P(A | A1,¬A2) = P(A). Let us call this
condition (2*). The conjunction of (2*) together with P(A | A1, A2) > P(A)
does not imply P(A | A1) = P(A) or P(A | A2) = P(A) and so the coher-
entist is not committed to condition (2). Huemer is again clear that, while (2*)
allows us to avoid P(A | ¬A1,¬A2) > P(A), this does not provide a vindica-
tion of coherence justification. This is true despite the fact that (2*) is not only
compatible with (1*) and (3), but even with (1) and (3). Consider the following
scenario.
Suppose again that there are two witnesses to the landing of a coin. As before,
A is the proposition that the coin landed heads up. In this scenario, each witness
gives his or her report independently. Each witness tells the truth with a prob-
ability of 2/3, lies with a probability of 1/3 and is silent with a probability of
zero. In this case, conditions (1), (2*) and (3) are all satisfied. It is clear, though,
that each witness has some individual credibility since each one is more likely
to tell the truth than to lie. So we cannot point to the compatibility of (1), (2*)
and (3) as support for BonJour’s position, although it does offer an escape from
contradiction.
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2.3 Recurring coherence
Shogenji (2005) considers a case in which witnesses report on a sequence of events.
Colored marbles are drawn randomly from an urn. Each witness always lies about the
color of the marble drawn, always tells the truth or always randomizes. There are n
marbles and each witness is n − 1 times more likely to be a liar than a truth teller.
Suppose we hear two reports from each of two witnesses. Both witnesses assert that
the first marble was blue and that the second was green. Shogenji shows that this raises
the probability that the first marble was blue, even though neither report individually
has any impact on that probability.
However, despite this result, Shogenji concludes, based on a result similar to
Huemer’s impossibility result, that “BonJour’s intuitively plausible informal reasoning
for [justification by coherence from scratch] is deficient”. The case in which credi-
bility is generated by recurrent coherence seems to differ from the witness scenario
that BonJour refers to in that (i) the witnesses report on a sequence of separate events
and (ii), as Shogenji demonstrates, the four reports that we considered above (two
reports from each of two witnesses) are not conditionally independent relative to the
first marble being blue.
My view is that Shogenji’s finding, that recurrent coherence can generate justifica-
tion from scratch, is very close to a vindication of BonJour’s position on the witness
scenario. I argue that via a combination of Huemer’s and Shogenji’s insights we can
arrive at that vindication.
3 Circumstantial stories
Key to the intuitive plausibility of coherence justification in the witness scenario is
that Lewis refers to witnesses telling the same circumstantial story. I take this to mean
that the witnesses agree on details that are not essential but rather incidental to the
proposition of primary significance. In order to take account of this feature of the
witness scenario let us introduce three additional propositions to the formal model
described in the introduction. Let T be the circumstantial story. More formally, T
is a proposition that implies A, the proposition of primary significance, but is not
implied by A. Let Ti be the proposition that the testimony of witness i implies T . So
P(A | T ), P(A1 | T1) and P(A2 | T2) are all equal to one.
Let us consider how the three conditions should be adapted to this model, beginning
with condition (1).
3.1 Witness independence
As in the original condition (1), we will require that A1 and A2 are independent when
the truth value of A is fixed. They should also be independent when the truth value of
T is fixed. For brevity, let us denote this requirement by A1 ⊥ A2 | A,¬A, T,¬T . By
this notation we mean that the two propositions on the left, separated by the symbol ⊥,
are conditionally independent relative to any one of the propositions that come after
the vertical line. So, for example, condition (1) could be written as A1 ⊥ A2 | A,¬A.
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We should similarly require that A1 and T2 are conditionally independent relative
to each one of the four propositions A,¬A, T and ¬T . Of course, this goes for the
pair T1 and A2 also.
However, I think that T1 and T2 should be required to be conditionally independent
relative to each of the three propositions T,¬A and A ∧ ¬T only. To see why, let us
consider the following scenario.
Two individuals live in the same town but do not know each other. Each day
they both decide whether to bring an umbrella to work. They are both influenced
by whether it is raining and, if it is raining, whether that rain is light or heavy.
There are not jointly influenced by any other factor. Let R be the proposition that
it is raining, and HR that there is heavy rain. Let B1 be the event that Ann brings
her umbrella, and B2 that Bob brings his. The events B1 and B2 are not proba-
bilistically independent since both individuals are influenced by the same weather.
However, B1 and B2 are independent when it is given that HR . They are also inde-
pendent when it is given that ¬R. But we should not expect them to be indepen-
dent when it is given that R. This is because both Ann and Bob are influenced by
whether the rain is heavy or light and we are not controlling for this factor. Simi-
larly, we should not expect B1 and B2 to be independent relative to ¬HR since both
individuals are influenced by whether there is light rain or no rain at all. We can,
however, expect B1 and B2 to be independent when it is given that R ∧ ¬HR (light
rain).
Similarly, we should expect T1 and T2 to be conditionally independent relative to
T,¬A and A ∧ ¬T , but not necessarily to A or ¬T . If we require T1 and T2 to be
conditionally independent relative to A then we are in effect assuming that a witness’s
decision to assert T is not affected by whether A∧¬T or T . This assumption does not
seem reasonable. A requirement that T1 and T2 be conditionally independent relative
to ¬T implies that a witness’s decision to assert T is not affected by whether A ∧¬T
or ¬A. This seems unreasonable since, for example, a witness who is intent on lying
about A will consider telling story T if A is false, but will not report T if A is true. So
condition (1) is adapted as follows.
(1**) Witness independence: A1 ⊥ A2 | A,¬A, T,¬T
A1 ⊥ T2 | A,¬A, T,¬T
T1 ⊥ A2 | A,¬A, T,¬T
T1 ⊥ T2 | T,¬A, A ∧ ¬T
3.2 Conditional credibility
According to the coherence theory of justification, the addition of an item of evidence
to a set of other items of evidence may raise the probability of a hypothesis supported
by that set of evidence if the new item is coherent with the others. Suppose the set
{A, Ti } raises the probability of T more than A alone does. That is, P(T | A, Ti ) >
P(T | A).This would be consistent with coherence justification since Ti is coherent
with A. Credibility can be given to Ti on the condition that it is accompanied by A in
the set of evidence.
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Let us suppose that the testimony of witness i has no impact on the probability of A.
That is, P(A | Ti ) = P(A). An implication of P(A | Ti ) = P(A) and P(A | T ) = 1
is that P(T | A, Ti ) > P(T | A) and P(T | Ti ) > P(T ) are logically equivalent (see
Claim 1 in the Appendix). Of course, P(T | Ti ) > P(T ) is also consistent with the
witness having some foundational, or intrinsic credibility. Crucially, however, if we
attach some weight of credibility to the witness irrespective of coherence between the
testimony of the witness and other evidence then we have not only P(T | Ti ) > P(T )
but also P(A | Ti ) > P(A). Indeed, we may even expect the impact of Ti on the
probability of A to be at least as great as its impact on the probability of T since A is
the weaker proposition.
On the other hand, the conjunction of P(T | Ti ) > P(T ) and P(A | Ti ) = P(A)
is compatible with coherence justification. This would be the case if the degree of
coherence between Ti and any proposition weaker than A were deemed to be insuffi-
cient for Ti to derive any credibility, while the more impressive degree of coherence
between Ti and A is considered sufficient.
Consider the following example. Let σ denote an arbitrary sequence of six numbers.
One morning I wake up and remember a vivid dream of a television lottery draw. So
vivid that I can recall the sequence σ of six numbers being drawn from the drum.
Let D6 be the proposition that I have this dream. Later in the day I watch the lottery
draw on television. As each number is drawn I see that it matches with the sequence
I dreamed of. It is only when the fifth number is drawn, matching the fifth number in
my dream, that I am sufficiently impressed by the degree of congruence to raise the
probability of the sixth number drawn being the sixth number in the sequence σ . Let V5
and V6 be the propositions that the first five and all six numbers, respectively, that I see
being drawn match with the sequence σ . So we have P(V6 | D6, V5) > P(V6 | V5)
and P(V5 | D6) = P(V5) and P(V5 | V6) = 1. It follows that P(V6 | D6) > P(V6).
The inequality P(V6 | D6) > P(V6) makes it appear as though I believe my dream
to have some intrinsic degree of credibility. But this is not so, as is evidenced by
P(V5 | D6) = P(V5).
Requiring both P(A | Ti ) = P(A) and P(T | Ti ) = P(T ) would mean that even
if, hypothetically, we were to learn that much of what the witness reported is in fact
true we would not give any credibility to the remainder of his or her testimony. I think
that this goes beyond the case of a witness with “no antecedent degree of warrant or
credibility” that BonJour (1985, p. 148) has in mind, and that we should require just
P(A | Ti ) = P(A). The adaption of condition (2) then is as follows.
(2**) Individual irrelevance w.r.t. A: P(A | T1) = P(A)
P(A | T2) = P(A)
3.3 Coherence justification
I think that BonJour’s claim about the witness scenario, when translated into the
language of probability theory, is that conditions (1**) and (2**) are compatible with
the following condition.
(3*) Coherence justification: P(A | T1, T2) > P(A)
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The probability space illustrated in Fig. 1 shows that that (1**), (2**) and (3*) are
indeed mutually compatible.3 In that figure the large rectangle represents a sample
space and each one of the 32 square cells represents an outcome. Each outcome is
equally likely. The letter A above a column indicates that the outcomes in that column
are elements of A. So A is the set of all 16 outcomes in the left half of the rectangle,
and T is the set of outcomes in the third and fourth columns. Similarly, A1 is written
next to a row to indicate that the outcomes in that row are elements of A1, and so on.
The elements of T1 and T2 are indicated by hatching and solid shading respectively.
Conditions (1**) and (2**) together with P(T | A, T1) > P(T | A) and P(T |
A, T2) > P(T | A) jointly imply that condition (3*) is true (see Claim 2 in the
Appendix).
Fig. 1 A probability
distribution satisfying conditions
(1**), (2**) and (3*)
3.4 Negative coherence justification
As discussed above, Huemer (2011) proves that conditions (2) and (3) together
imply P(A | ¬A1,¬A2) > P(A). This consequent is called negative coher-
ence justification. By the same logical argument, conditions (2**) and (3*) imply
P(A | ¬T1,¬T2) > P(A). In Fig. 1 we have P(A) = 1/2 and P(A | ¬T1,¬T2) =
10/19. Note, however, that we do not have negative coherence justification since
P(A | ¬A1,¬A2) = P(A).
While P(A | ¬A1,¬A2) > P(A) would be unacceptable, I think that P(A |
¬T1,¬T2) > P(A) is acceptable. In Fig. 1 we can see that the conjunction of A1 ∧ A2
and ¬T1 ∧ ¬T2 raises the probability of A while A1 ∧ A2 alone does not. This is
consistent with coherence justification. Loosely speaking, adding ¬T1∧¬T2 to A1∧A2
makes it more likely that both witnesses tell the same circumstantial story in support
of A, though a story different from T . Suppose two witnesses agree that the defendant
in a criminal trial was in a cafë on a particular afternoon. We ask each witness what
3 Condition (1**) requires that T1 and T2 are conditionally independent relative to A ∧ ¬T , but, in Fig. 1,
P(T1 ∧ A ∧ ¬T ) = 0 which means that P(T2 | T1, A,¬T ) is not defined and so we cannot claim
that P(T2 | T1, A,¬T ) = P(T2 | A,¬T ). However, there is a more general, though less intuitive,
definition of conditional independence. The more general definition requires P(T1 ∧ T2 | A,¬T ) =
P(T1 | A,¬T )P(T2 | A,¬T ). That equality does hold in Fig. 1.
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beverage the defendant ordered at the cafë, an incidental detail. If it is given that neither
witness states that the defendant had tea then the probability that both witnesses state
the same beverage is raised. It is because ¬T1 ∧ ¬T2 raises the probability of the
conjunction of A1 ∧ A2 and ¬T1 ∧ ¬T2 that we have P(A | ¬T1,¬T2) > P(A).
4 Discussion
We have seen that two independent items of evidence that are individually irrelevant
to a given hypothesis can jointly raise the probability of that hypothesis if those items
agree on incidental details. For example, suppose that I have a memory of a rock with
a patch of moss being in a particular place. And I look at that place and see a rock with
a patch of moss on it. I do not trust either this memory or current appearance. If I had
knowledge of there being a rock in that location, though did not know whether it was
mossy, then I would give some credibility to both the memory and current appearance
of a rock with a patch of moss by virtue of their coherence with that knowledge. But
I do not have knowledge of there being a rock and, moreover, neither my memory
nor sense of sight provides me with any confirmation that there is a rock due to my
mistrust in them. Yet, the combination of those two pieces of evidence, which I believe
to be independent of one another, does provide me with some degree of confirmation
that there is a rock.
Coherence among memories, perceptions and spontaneous beliefs can potentially
confirm some of their contents to some degree without us having to bestow them with
intrinsic credibility. We need only hold that they each would be deserving of credibility
if we knew some substantial part of what they report to be accurate.
One weakness of the argument presented here is that I presuppose a method of
assigning prior probabilities. How does one assign a prior probability to there being
a rock in a particular place? This point is discussed by Huemer (2007). It may be that
the kind of probabilistic analysis presented here is not appropriate for the question of
epistemology being addressed. We must also ask how it is possible to establish inde-
pendence among pieces of evidence. This question is addressed by Shogenji (2002).
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5 Appendix
Claim 1 Assume P(A | T ) = 1 and P(A | Ti ) = P(A). Then P(T | A, Ti ) > P(T |
A) if and only if P(T | Ti ) > P(T ).
Proof We can write P(T | A, Ti ) > P(T | A) as
P(T ∧ A ∧ Ti )
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and, since P(A | T ) = 1, this can be rewritten as
P(T ∧ Ti )
P(A ∧ Ti ) >
P(T )
P(A)
which is equivalent to
P(Ti )P(T | Ti )
P(Ti )P(A | Ti ) >
P(T )
P(A)
and so we have
P(T | Ti )




Therefore, since P(A | Ti ) = P(A), we have
P(T | Ti ) > P(T ).
So P(T | A, Ti ) > P(T | A) implies P(T | Ti ) > P(T ), and by following the same
steps in reverse order we can see that the implication goes in the other direction also.
Claim 2 Assume condition (2**) is true and T1 ⊥ T2 | T,¬A, A ∧ ¬T [the last
line of condition (1**)] and P(A | T ) = 1. Then condition (3*) is true if and only
if P(T | T1, A) and P(T | T2, A) are both strictly greater than, or both strictly less
than, P(T | A).
Proof The probability P(T1 ∧ T2 | A) is equal to
P(T1 ∧ T2 | A,¬T )P(¬T | A) + P(T1 ∧ T2 | T )P(T | A)
and, given that T1 ⊥ T2 | T, A ∧ ¬T , we can rewrite this as
P(T1 | A,¬T )P(T2 | A,¬T )P(¬T | A) + P(T1 | T )P(T2 | T )P(T | A).
For brevity, let xi = P(Ti | A,¬T ), yi = P(Ti | T ) and t = P(T | A). So we have
P(T1 ∧ T2 | A) = (1 − t)x1x2 + t y1 y2.
By definition, T1 ⊥ T2 | ¬A implies that P(T1 ∧ T2 | ¬A) equals P(T1 | ¬A)P(T2 |
¬A). Condition (2**) implies that P(Ti | ¬A) equals P(Ti | A). So P(T1 ∧ T2 | ¬A)
is equal to P(T1 | A)P(T2 | A). Note that P(Ti | A) is equal to ((1 − t)xi + t yi ). So
P(T1 ∧ T2 | ¬A) = ((1 − t)x1 + t y1)((1 − t)x2 + t y2)
= (1 − t)2x1x2 + t2 y1 y2 + t (1 − t)(x1 y2 + x2 y1).
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Hence, P(T1 ∧ T2 | A) − P(T1 ∧ T2 | ¬A) is
t (1 − t)(x1x2 + y1 y2 − x1 y2 − x2 y1)
or, equivalently,
t (1 − t)(y1 − x1)(y2 − x2).
We can see that P(T1 ∧ T2 | A) − P(T1 ∧ T2 | ¬A) has the same sign as (y1 −
x1)(y2 − x2). Therefore, P(T1 ∧ T2 | A) > P(T1 ∧ T2 | ¬A) if and only if (y1 > x1
and y2 > x2) or (y1 < x1 and y2 < x2).
The inequality P(T1 ∧T2 | A) > P(T1 ∧T2 | ¬A) is logically equivalent to P(T1 ∧
T2 | A) > P(T1 ∧ T2), which is equivalent to P(A | T1, T1) > P(A). And, since T
implies A, the inequality yi > xi is equivalent to P(Ti | T, A) > P(Ti | A,¬T ) and
so also to P(Ti | T, A) > P(Ti | A) and, therefore, to P(T | Ti , A) > P(T | A).
Similarly, yi < xi is equivalent to P(T | Ti , A) < P(T | A).
So we have (A | T1, T1) > P(A) if and only if either P(T | Ti , A) > P(T | A)
for both i ∈ {1, 2} or P(T | Ti , A) < P(T | A) for both i ∈ {1, 2}.
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